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Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax
Commission
?#DTS\
Civil No- 88-0251 Priority 14A

Dear Mr- B u t l e r :
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recently decided a
case entitled Northern Natural Gas Company and Enron Liquids
Pipeline Company v- State Board of Equalization and Assessment,
88-706 (July 14, 1989).
As Amicus Curiae in Amax v. Tax
Commission, the Utah Mining Association, believes that the
Nebra ska case is relevant to the issues before the Utah Supreme
Court in the above-captioned Amax appeal. Six copies of the
Nebraska case are enclosed for the Court's convenience.
The Utah Mining Association understands that a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court of Nebraska's decision
is pending before that Court.
Yours sincerely,
4&,

Kent W. Winterholler
Attorney for Utah Mining
Association Amicus Curiae
KWW:sp
Enclosures
nn:

Mark Buchi (w/encl.)

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA

Case TJtjg
Northern Natural Gas Company and Enron Liquids
Pipeline Company, Appellants,
v.
State Board of Equalization and Assessment, Appellee.

Case Caption
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Bd. of Equal.

Filed Julv 14, 1989.

No. 88-706.

Appeal from the State Board of Equalization and Assessment.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
John K. Boyer, Norman H. Wright, and Amy S. Bones, of Fraser,
Stryker, Vaughn, Meusey, Olson, Boyer & Bloch, P.C., for
appellants.
Robert M. Spire, Attorney General, and L. Jay Bartel for
appellee.

NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO- V. STATE BD. OF EQUAL.
NO. 88-706 - filed July 14, 1989.

1.

State Equalization Board:

Appeal and Error.

Neb. Rev. Stat.

§ 77-510 (Cum- Supp. 1988) provides that any person, county, or
municipality affected by a final decision of the State Board of
Equalization and Assessment may prosecute an appeal to the Supreme
Court.
2.

Administrative Law: Appeal and Error.

When an appeal from an

administrative agency is not taken pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act because of a special statute, the standard of review
in this court, is to search only for errors appearing in the record;
i.e.,

whether

the decision conforms to

law,

is supported

by

competent and relevant evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable.
3.

State Equalization Board:

Board

of Equalization

Taxation:

and Assessment

Valuation.

The State

has a wide latitude of

judgment and discretion in equalizing assessment of property.
4*

:

Assessment

:
acts

.

The State Board of Equalization and

in a quasi-judicial

capacity

when

equalizing

property.
5.

Appeal and Error.

In instances where the Supreme Court is

required to review a case for error appearing in the record,
questions of law are nonetheless reviewed de novo on the record.
6.

State Equalization Board:

Error.

Taxation:

Valuation:

Appeal and

In an application before the State Board of Equalization

and Assessment, a taxpayer may employ any factual or legal argument

subject to the final determination of questions of law on a de novo
basis by this court on appeal.
m:

7.

:

:

.

When

the

State

Board

of

Equalization and Assessment arbitrarily undervalues a particular
class

of

property

so

as

to make

another

class

of

property

disproportionately higher, or achieves the same result because of
legislative

action,

constitutional

the

Supreme

Court

must

correct

inequity by lowering the complaining

that

taxpayer's

valuation to such an extent as to equalize it with other property
in the state.
8.

State Equalization Board:

Taxation:

Federal Acts:

Equal

Protection. The State Board of Equalization and Assessment, by not
taxing the personal property of certain property

in a class,

although acting involuntarily and under compulsion of federal law,
nevertheless, by complying with that mandate, has denied another
taxpayer

in that

same class the equal protection

of the law

contrary to the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
9.

Constitutional Law:

Taxation:

Valuation.

The right of a

taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at 100 percent of its true
value is to have his, her, or its assessment

reduced to the

percentage of that value at which others are taxed even though this
is a departure from the requirement of statute.
10.
standard

:
of

:
the

. Where it is impossible to secure both the
true value, and

the uniformity

and

equality

required by law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the
just and ultimate purpose of law.

11.

Taxation:

Property:

Words and Phrases.

For tax purposes in

Nebraska, personal property includes all property other than real
property and franchises.
12.

Property:

Appurtenances:

Intent.

To determine whether an

i f . constitutes a fixture, this court looks at three (actors:

(1 ,

actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto,
(2) appropriation to the use or purpose or that part of the realty
with which it is connected, and (3) the intention of the party
making the annexation to make the article a permanent accession to
the freehold.
13.

:

:

• Of the three factors determining whether

an item constitutes a fixture, the most important is the intention
to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold.
14.

:

:

•

The intention of the party making the

annexation can be inferred from the nature of the articles affixed,
the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the
structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for which
the annexation has been made.
15.

Property:

Appurtenances.

In considering

the

issue of

annexation, an important factor is whether removal of the article
will injure the realty or will injure the article itself.
16.
to

:
the

realty,

.

If a chattel is a necessary or useful adjunct

then

it may be

said

generally

to have

been

appropriated to the use or purpose of the realty to which it was
affixed.
17.

Constitutional Law:

Taxation:

Valuation.

Although the

taxing authorities may classify different types of property for
taxation

purposes,

nevertheless,

the

results

reached

by

such

different methods and reasonable classifications must be correlated

so

that

the

proportionate.

valuations

reached

shall

be

unifora

and

Hastings, C.J., Boslaugh, White, Caporale, Shanahan, Grant,
and Fahrnbruch, JJ.
HASTINGS, C,J.
This is an appeal by Northern Natural Gas Company and Enron
Liquids Pipeline Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as
Enron) from a decision of the Nebraska state Board of Equalization
and Assessment (the Board)

with respect to a request made by Enron

for equalization of centrally assessed property.
Enron appealed directly to this court pursuant to Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 77-510 (Cum. Supp. 1988), which provides in part:
any

final

decision

of

the

State

Board

of

Equalization

"From
and

Assessment with respect to the valuation of any real or personal
property, any person, county, or municipality affected thereby may
prosecute an appeal to the Supreme Court."
Since appeal

was

not

taken pursuant

to Neb. Rev. Stat.

§ 84-918 (Reissue 1987) of the Administrative Procedure Act, this
court's standard of review is not de novo on the record.

This

cou-t has decided that when the Administrative Procedure Act is
inapplicable because another method of appeal has been prescribed,
the standard of review will be to search only for errors appearing
in the record; i.e., whether the decision conforms to law, is
supported

by

competent

and

relevant

evidence,

and

was

not

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In re Application A-15738.
226 Neb. 146, 410 N.W.2d 101 (1987) (direct appeal to the Supreme
Court from the Department of Water Resources); Banner County v.
State Bd. of Equal.. 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35 (1987).
The disputes involved in this appeal arose in part as a result
of three cases which were decided by the U.S. District Court for

the District of Nebraska: Trailer Train Co. et al. v. Leuenbpr^^
No. CV87-L-29 (D. Neb. Dec. 11, 1987), aff'4 No. 88-1118 (8th Cir.
Dec. 19, 1988), cert, denied. Boehm v. Trailer Train Co. et * ] . r
U.S.

,

S. Ct.

, 104 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1989); Burlinaf.n^

Northern RR. Co. et al. v. Leuenbercxer, No. CV87-L-565 (D. Neb.
Dec.

10,

1987);

and Oklahoma

Gas

& Electric

Co. et

al. v.

r^euenberaer. No. CV88-L-52 (D. Neb. Jan. 26, 1988).
The plaintiffs

in Trailer Train were car companies

that

furnish railcars to railroads. Their only relationship to Nebraska
stems from the fact that their railcars are located or operated in
Nebraska by.the railroads.
the

assessment

of

The federal district court held that

the plaintiffs1

personal

property

and

the

imposition, levy, or collection of any personal property taxes
against the plaintiffs pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-624 et
seq.

(Reissue

1986)

violates

§ 306(1)(d)

of

the

Railroad

Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 4-R Act) , and
permanently enjoined the imposition, levy, and collection of any
personal property taxes from the plaintiffs.

On appeal, the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the
levy and collection of Nebraska's ad valorem tax on car company
property violated the 4-R Act.
The plaintiffs in Burlington Northern RR. Co. were several of
the railroads that do business in Nebraska.

The federal district

court preliminarily enjoined and restrained the collection of ad
valorem property tax payments for tax year 1987 on that portion of
plaintiffs' operating property that consists of personal property.
The

court

issued

the

preliminary

injunction

after

finding

reasonable cause to believe that the personal property tzx levied

on the plaintiffs results in'.discriminatory treatment of common
carriers by railroad, in violation of § 306(1)(d) of the 4-R Act.
The plaintiffs in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. were carlir.es
doing business in Nebraska.

The federal district court enjoined

distribution of the Nebraska carline tax for the 1987 tax year,
finding reasonable cause to believe that the tax violates § 3 06 of
the 4-R Act,
The result in each case was reached through application of
the 4-R Act, a federal statute.

To prevent the unreasonable

burdening of interstate commerce that results from discriminatory
state and local taxation of rail carrier property, Congress enacted
the 4-R Act, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 54, § 306 (codified at
49 U.S.C. § 26c (1976); recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982) in
accordance with the revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978) .
At issue in Trailer Train was whether Nebraska's personal
property taxation system, which provides for extensive exemptions
from personal property tax under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-202 (Supp.
1987), violates § 306(1)(d) of the 4-R Act, which prohibits the
imposition of any tax which results in discriminatory treatment of
a common carrier by railroad.

The federal district court found

that the Nebraska system of taxation did violate the
statute.

federal

According to the court,

Under the Nebraska scheme, the majority of the personal
property in the state is statutorily exempted from taxation,
while a minority of personal property, including all the
property that belongs to Trailer Train in the state, is
subject to an ad valorem tax on its actual value. . . . [T]he
Nebraska system favors a majority of the property of possible
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taxpayers by exempting that property from taxation but denies
the property of rail car lines the same favorable treatment.
Trailer Train, supra, slip. op. at 6. The court further found that
the actual result of Nebraska's taxation scheme is an unfair and
discriminatory tax burden on the railroads.
In light of the federal district court's rulings in the three
cases discussed above, Enron submitted a request with the Board
asking that its unit values be equalized with the railroads and car
companies doing business in Nebraska, i.e., that the portion of the
unit value that is comprised of personal property be disregarded
in determining the amount of property tax it owes .to the state.
In conjunction with this request, Enron also sought a determination
that its pipelines constitute personal property.
Enron is a public service entity within the meaning of Neb.
Rev. Stat.

§ 77-801

(Reissue 1986).

Northern Natural Gas, a

division of Enron Corporation, owns, maintains, and operates a gas
pipeline system in Nebraska.

Enron Liquids, a subsidiary of Enron

Corporation, owns, maintains, and operates a liquid hydrocarbon
pipeline in Nebraska.

Enron's property is centrally assessed by

the state for property tax purposes through the Tax Commissioner
rather than county assessors, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-802
(Cum. Supp* 1988).
To establish the value of a centrally assessed taxpayer, the
Department of Revenue uses a methodology known as "unit value."
Rather than valuing individual items of property owned by such a
taxpayer, the department values the property of the taxpayer as a
total unit.

Dennis Donner, the central assessment manager of the

Department of Revenue, explained the unit value method at the
Board's August 2, 1988, hearing:
These- values are derived by use of the unit value concept,
which is a valuation of the company as a going concern, as
opposed to just a simple summary of the assets of the company.
The Department uses the traditional three approaches to value,
that being the market[,] income and cost approach in
developing these values, and then it correlates the results
into an indication of value for the company. This value is
then allocated to the state of Nebraska, based on varying
factors, depending on which particular industry we're
referring to.

Once the department has calculated the unit value of the
centrally assessed taxpayer and determined what pozrtion of that
value should be taxed by Nebraska, the Tax Commissioner apportions
the

total

taxable value

to all taxing

subdivisions

in which

property of the taxpayer is located and certifies to the county
assessors the value so determined.
During
Enron's

the August

request

§ 77-802.

2, 1988, hearing,

for equalization

with

companies doing business in Nebraska.

the Board

the

railroads

dismissed
and

car

Additionally, the Board

decided to equalize Enron's property, and all other centrally
assessed property, through application of a statewide "aggregate
level of assessment" determined by the Department of Revenue to be
8 8.7 percent of actual value. The department first calculated the
average ratio of assessed value to actual value for all classes of
tangible

property:

residential

(improved

and

unimproved),

commercial and industrial (improved and unimproved), agricultural
(improved and unimproved), personal, and centrally assessed.

Then

the department aggregated the average ratios to arrive at the 88.7
percent figure.
At the Board1s August 2, 1988, hearing, Enron objected to
being equalized with the statewide "aggregate level of assessment"
of 88.7 percent of value.

In dismissing the matter, the Board

stated in its order:
[T]he uncontraverted [sic] evidence shows that all property
valued by the state, including the property of Enron, is at
100 percent of value; that said property is equalized to che
same level of value as all property valued by the state that
being the aggregate level of value for all tangible property
in this state; and, that the State Board has properly
fulfilled its duty to equalize all the tangible property in
the state.

Enron argues before this court that its property should be assessed
at 73.7 percent of actual value, the aggregate level at which
unimproved agricultural land is being valued in this state.
Since the perfection of this appeal, on December 19, 1988, an
opinion was filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit which affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Couxrt in
Trailer Train
Dec. 11, 1988).

Co. et al. v. Leuenberaer, No. CV87-L-29 (D. Neb.
That court said in part:

In [Burlinoton Northern R. Co. v. Bair. 584 F. Supp. 1229
(S.D. Iowa 1984)] the other centrally assessed taxpayers were
still subject to the personal property tax as are the
taxpayers here who are not in agriculturally related
businesses.
The railroad in that case received the same
"preferential tax treatment" that Trailer Train is accorded
here. This is because the o:.:er taxpayers are not protected
by § 306(1)(d).
When three-fourths of the commercial and
industrial personal property in the state is not taxed because

personal property used in agriculturally-related business is
exempt* railroads are discriminated against if their personal
property is taxed. The appropriate remedy, as awarded by the
trial court, is to enjoin the collection of the discriminating
tax, even though other taxpayers do not receive the same
benefits.
Trailer Train Co. et al. v. Leuenberaer, No. 88-1118, slip. op. at
7 (8th Cir. Dec. 19, 1988).

Following argument of the case in this

court, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an order on
May 15, 1989, denying the petition for certiorari filed by the Tax
Commissioner

of

Nebraska.

Therefore,

the

Board's

argument

throughout its brief that the judgment of the U.S. District Court
is not binding in this instance is no longer valid.
Enron assigns as error:

(1) The Board erred in dismissing

its request for equalization; (2) the Board erred in failing to
find Enron's pipelines to be personal property and to equalize that
portion

of

its correlated

companies doing business
adopting and applying

unit value with
in Nebraska;

railroads

(3) the Board

a "blended" or "aggregate"

and car
erred in

equalization

ratio, composed of an average of the levels at which all various
types of property are valued; and (4) the Board erred in failing
to equalize-Enron's property with unimproved agricultural land.
Basically, Enron made two requests of the Board.

First, it

contended that its property should be equalized with the property
of the railroads and car companies operating in Nebraska, which
were also assessed on a unitary basis.

In other words, the final

judgment of the federal court enjoined the State of Nebraska from
assessing the personal property of railroads and car companies,

and Enron insists that it not be taxed on that portion of its unit
value that represents personal property•

In that connection, it

further argues that its pipelines are personal property and should
not be assessed.

Secondly, Enron did not want the Board to

equalize its other property with the aggregate level of assessment
for

all

property

in

the

state,

including

centrally

assessed

property such as Enron's which is assessed at 100 percent of actual
value.
The Board argues that it lacks authority and jurisdiction to
consider and act on the issues raised by Enron

in the first

instance, and therefore this court acquired no jurisdiction to
consider the issues on appeal.

In other words, the issues raise

questions of law, including constitutional issues, and the Board
insists that it has no authority to consider those issues.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-505 (Cum. Supp. 1988) requires the Board
to review the abstracts of assessments of property submitted by the
county assessors and to equalize such valuations for tax purposes
within the state.

More pertinent to this case, § 77-802 requires

the Tax Commissioner to determine the total taxable value of a
public service entity like Enron for each of the local assessing
districts.

The action of the Tax Commissioner, of course, is

appealable to the Board.

This court has stated the Board has a

wide latitude of judgment and discretion in equalizing assessment
of property.

Citv* of Omaha v. State Board of Equalization &

Assessment, 181 Neb. 734, 150 N.W.2d 888 (1967).

The Board acts

in a quasi-judicial capacity when equalizing property.

Box Butte

County v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 206 Neb. 696,
295 N.W.2d 670 (1980).

County boards of equalization are required

to make the initial determination as to whether certain locally
assessed property is exempt from taxation, which involves a mixed
question of fact and law.

See, e.g., Ev. Luth. Soc. v. fluff*\n

Ctv. Bd. of Equal, , 230 Neb. 135, 430 N.W.2d 502 (1988); Bethohace
Com. Servs. v. County Board. 221 Neb, 886, 381 N.W.2d 166 (1986).
Implicit in the determination of tax exemption, as pointed
out

in

Bethphaae,

§ 77-202(1)(c),

which

was

the

application

provides

that

exempt

of

the

from

facts

to

taxation

is

property "owned by . . . religious, charitable . . . organizations
and used exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes . . . . M
Certainly this involves a mixed question of fact and law and
involves the quasi-judicial power of the board of equalization.
In the instant case, there is a difference between Enron being
able to request equalization with the railroads and car companies
and Enron being entitled to be equalized with the railroads and car
companies.

It is common sense that Enron cannot be equalized with

those companies unless it makes a request.

It also seems clear

that to make such a request, Enron must start with the Board, the
only entity with statutory authority to equalize the valuations of
centrally assessed taxpayers. As previously stated, our review on
an appeal such as this is for error appearing in the record, but
we review questions of law de novo on the record.
We therefore hold that in an application before the Board, a
taxpayer may employ any factual or legal argument in support of
his, her, or its position requesting equalization, subject to the
final determination of questions of law on a de novo basis by this
court on appeal.
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Article VIII, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution provides in
relevant part that except for motor vehicles, "[tjaxes shall be
levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible
property . . . . w

It would seem that no question exists that if

the Board arbitrarily undervalues a particular class of property
so as to make another class of property disproportionately higher,
or achieves the same result because of legislative action, this
court: must correct that constitutional inequity by lowering the
complaining
equalize

taxpayer's valuation to such an extent

it with other property

in the state.

so

See,

as to
Kearney

Convention Center v. Board of Equal., 216 Neb. 292, 344 N.W.2d 620
(1984); Banner County v. State Bd. of Equal.. 226 Neb. 236, 411
N.W.2d 35 (1987).

This being the case, no logical reason exists

why the same requirement of valuation reduction should not be
imposed when the disproportionality is brought about by a final
judgment of the federal court exempting the personal property of*
the railroads and car companies from the imposition of a state tax.
The state, by not taxing the personal property of railroads
and

car

companies,

although

acting

involuntarily

and

under

compulsion of federal law, nevertheless, by complying with that
mandate, has denied Enron equal protection of the law contrary to
the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
In Sioux Citv Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 S. ct.
190, 67 L. Ed. 340. (1923), the county taxed the bridge company's
property at actual value while other property in the county was
assessed at only 55 percent of its value.

The bridge company

alleged this practice violated the equal protection clause of the
14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Citing Sunday Lake Iron Co, v. Wakefie^. 247 U.S. 350, 38 S.
Ct. 495, 62 L. Ed. 1154 (1918), the Court stated:
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents. And it must be regarded as settled that intentional
systematic undervaluation by state officials of other taxable
property in the same class contravenes the constitutional
right of one taxed upon the full value of his property."

(Citations omitted.)

Sioux Citv Bridge, supra. 260 U.S. at 445.

The Court held that the taxing of the bridge company's property at
100 percent of its actual value while other property is taxed at
55 percent of its actual value violates the equal protection clause
of the 14th amendment.
The Court also held that
the right of the taxpayer whose property alone is taxed at
100 per cent of its true value is to have his assessment
reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are
taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of
statute. The conclusion is based on the principle that where
it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true
value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the
latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate
purpose of law.
260 U.S. at 446.
As we have previously stated, it makes no difference if the
undervaluation of the property of the railroad and car companies
comes about because of deliberate action by the Board, legislative

enactment, or the final and binding judgment of the federal courts.
The conclusion remains the same:

The equal protection clause of

the 14th amendment mandates that the same result be reached with
respect to the personal property

of Enron as that in the case of

the railroad and car companies.
It therefore

becomes necessary

to determine whether

the

pipelines of Enron are personal property and thus exempt from
taxation under the doctrine of Trailer Train Co.. et al. v.
Leuenberaer. No. CV87-L-29

(D. Neb. Dec. 11, 1987), afffd No.

88-1118 (8th Cir. Dec. 19, 1988), cert, denied, Boehm v. Trailer
Train Co. et al. ,

U.S.

,

S. Ct.

, 104 L. Ed. 2d 630

(1989) .
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-103 (Reissue 1986) provides:
The terms real property, real estate and lands shall
include city and village lots and all other lands, and all
buildings, fixtures, improvements, cabin trailers or mobile
homes which shall have been permanently attached to the real
estate upon which they are situated, mines, minerals,
quarries, mineral springs and wells, oil and gas wells,
overriding royalty interests and production payments with
respect to oil or gas leases, units of beneficial interest in
trusts, the corpus of which includes any of the foregoing, and
privileges pertaining thereto.

Personal property includes all property other than real property
and franchises.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-104 (Reissue 1986).

The

issue therefore is whether pipelines are fixtures, and thus real
property, or are personal property.
Section 77-103 does not provide a definition for fixtures.
However, this court in State ex rel. Hever v. Peter^. 191 Neb. 330,

215 N.W.2d 520 (1974), stated that the common-lav rules relating
to fixtures are largely codified in § 77-103.
To determine whether an item constitutes a fixture, this court
looks at three factors:

(1) actual annexation to the realty, or

something appurtenant thereto,

(2) appropriation to the use or

purpose of that part of the realty with which it is connected, and
(3) the intention of the party making the annexation to make the
article a permanent accession to the freehold.

Bank of Valley v.

U.S.

592

Nat.

Bank,

215

Neb.

912,

341

N.W.2d

(1983);

T-V

Transmission v. County Bd. of Equal.. 215 Neb. 363, 338 N.W.2d 752
(1983).
The

third

factor,

the

intention

to make

the

article

a

permanent accession to the freehold, is generally regarded as the
most important factor when determining whether an article is a
fixture.

The other two factors, annexation and appropriation to

the use of the realty, have value primarily as evidence of such
intention.

See generally Bank of Valley v. U.S. Nat. Bank, supra.

The intention of the party making the annexation can be inferred
from the nature of the articles affixed, the relation and situation
of the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of
annexation, and tha purpose or use for which the annexation has
been made.

Bank of Valley v. U.S. Nat. Bank, supra: PisK v.

Fordvce C O - O P Credit Assn.. 225 Neb. 714, 408 N.W.2d 248 (1987);
Fuel Exploration, Inc. v. Novotnv, 221 Neb. 17, 374 N.W.2d 838
(1985).
In this case, the pipelines are buried in the ground.

In

sulphur Springs Val. Elec. C O O P , v. city of Tombstone. 1 Ariz. App.
268, 401 P.2d 753 (1965), affyd 99 Ariz. 110, 407 P.2d 76, the
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Arizona court had to address whether the pipes, poles, and wires
that were the chief components of a utility distribution system
were fixtures and therefore real property that had to be sold at
public auction.

To determine whether an article is a fixture, the

Arizona

consider

courts

the

same

three

factors

this

court

considers.
The pipes were buried in the ground.

The court noted that

there was no evidence of an agreement between the city and owners
of the fee that the chattels were to become accessions to the
realty.

The court held that because there was no proof of the

adaptability to the use for which the real estate was appropriated
and no proof of an intent by the annexor that the attachment of the
chattels be permanent,

despite annexation

to the realty,

the

utility equipment had not lost its character as personal property.
In considering

the

issue of annexation

when

determining

whether an article is a fixture, some courts have looked at whether
removal of the article will injure the realty or will injure the
article itself.

Enron quotes at length from one such case.

In Stem Brothers, Inc. v. Alexandria Township. 6 N.J. Tax
537 (1984), the question was whether certain underground
storage tanks were fixtures or personal property. In this
case, the court focused upon the injury by removal test, and
stated: "These [the five underground storage tanks] could be
lifted from the subject property intact just as could be done
with the 20,000 gallon above-ground tanks and no damage at all
would occur to the tanks. The only preparatory work that
would need to be done before the tanks could be lifted onto
a truck would be removal of the soil covering them.
The
excavation that would result from uncovering one of the 20,000
gallon tanks would be large. Each such tank is ten feet in
diameter and 3 0 feet long so that the excavation would have

to be somewhat longer, wider, and deeper than those
dimensions. Despite this size, however, such an excavation
could not in any reasonable sense be said to constitute
•irreparable1 physical damage to the land because the hole
could easily be refilled. As a result, the land would be
virtually the same in all respects as it had been before. The
sole question, then, is whether the excavation would
constitute 'serious1 physical damage to the land within the
meaning of the phrase 'material injury* as used in the
Business Personal Property Tax Act . • .
•

• • •

"Some of the factors which might have to be considered
in determining whether 'serious physical damage' had occurred
to unimproved land are: (a) any change in the market value
of the land as a result of the condition; (b) the amount of
time and the cost required to repair the condition; and (c)
the hazard or dislocation caused by the condition.
M
I find that no 'serious physical damage1 would be caused
to plaintiff's land by an excavation to remove the underground
storage tanks and to restore plaintiff's unpaved parking yard
to its original state. There is no indication that the value
of the land would be affected by such an excavation. The
entire process of removing a tank and restoring the ground to
its original state would require only two days and would
create no serious hazard or dislocation. Finally, the cost
to excavate and refill the hole would be relatively
insignificant.
W
I therefore conclude that all nine of plaintiff's fuel
oil storage tanks were business personal property for the tax
year 1981 and that the tanks should not have been assessed by
the taxing district for local property tax purposes. 6 N.J.
Tax at 543."
Brief for appellants at 26-27.
Earl Berdine, an Enron employee, testified in his deposition
that very little damage generally results to the pipe when it is

removed and that the only damage to the land

is "a temporary

inconvenience while the work is actually going on and then after
the work is completed the land is restored, put back into its
original use."
The second factor, appropriation to the use or purpose of that
part of the realty with which the article is connected, focuses on
the relationship between the article and the use which is made of
the realty to which the article is attached.

If the chattel is a

necessary or useful adjunct to the realty, then it may be said to
have been appropriated to the use or purpose of the realty to which
it was affixed.

If the chattel is attached for a use which does

not enhance the value of the land, it is generally deemed not to
become a part of the land.

See 1 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the

Modern Law of Real Property § 56 (1980).
The pipeline companies in Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. St.
Bd. of Equal. , 138 Mont. 603, 358 P.2d 55 (1960), cert, denied 366
U.S. 917, 81 S. Ct. 1095, 6 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1961), were attempting
to establish that their pipelines were real estate.

The pipelines

were imbedded in real estate rights-of-way obtained from the owners
of the fee by written conveyance. The State Board of Equalization
argued that the pipelines did not improve the real estate, served
no purpose on the land, did not enhance the value of the real
estate, and could be removed at any time by the company.
Under Montana case law, if property was placed on land to
improve it or make it more valuable, it was generally deemed a
fixture, but if it was attached for a use which did not enhance
the value of the land, it remained a chattel.

Considering the

estafciisned rules regarding fixtures, the Yellowstone Pipe Li,np rn
court stated:
The line could as easily lie on top of the ground were it not
for the maintenance problem brought on by its exposed position
and the difficulty of crossing natural and man-made
obstructions. Does the pipe line improve the land and make
it more valuable? To the contrary the land makes the pipe
line more valuable since it removes it from danger of damage
were it exposed. To what purpose is the pipe line put? it
is used for the transportation of petroleum products andr in
our opinion, such use bears no relationship whatever to the
use of the realty. There can exist here no presumption that
respondents intended the pipe to become part of the realty
because the evidence is conclusive that they had no such
intention.
Id. at 630-31, 358 P.2d at 69.

The court concluded that the

pipeline is not a fixture.
As Enron points out in this case, it has the right to remove
its pipeline and does so on occasion.

According to Enron, and we

agree, the pipeline is not adapted to the use to which the ground
in which it is embedded

is applied.

Most of the ground is

agricultural land, and while the pipe is in place, a farmer or
rancher may continue

to

conduct his normal operations.

The

pipeline do0» not improve the land nor make it more valuable.
ground is only a foundation upon which the pipes can rest.

The

Use of

the pipeline bears no relationship to the use of the realty, the
pipeline being buried in order in part to minimize maintenance.
Finally, was the intention of Enron to make the article a
permanent accession to the freehold?
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In a number of cases, the courts have considered the fact that
the annexor had an easement as establishing an intent that the
article remain personal
Co.

property.

In Southwestern Public Service

v. Chaves County, 85 N.M. 313, 512 P.2d 73 (1973), the court

had

to decide whether certain equipment

located on easements,

including poles and transmission lines, was real estate. The court
noted that if Southwestern intended the equipment installed on
unowned land to become part of the realty, Southwestern would,
under general law, be parting with title to the equipment.

The

court concluded that there was no evidence, of either a subjective
or

objective

intention.
COOP,

nature,

indicating

Southwestern

had

any

such

To the same effect, see, Sulphur Springs Val. ^ ^ Q ? .

v. Citv of Tombstone. 1 Ariz. App. 268, 401 P.2d 753 (1965*);

Liberty Lk. Sewer v. Liberty Lk. Utils.r 37 Wash. App. 809, 683
P.2d 1117 (1984); In re Mobilife Corp.. 167 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1964).
The evidence here was that Enron's normal method of operation
is to obtain easements for purposes of laying its pipelines.

Its

pipeline is generally located on rights-of-way rather than land
Enron owns in fee.

Enron never intended, as we view the record,

to part with the title to its pipelines by conducting its operation
in this manner.
retains

Furthermore, the evidence discloses that Enron

possession

of

the

pipes

for

purposes

of

repair,

replacement, and recycling if necessary.
The Board cites only one case in which the court held that
the gas pipeline of a gas transmission company was not personal
property but, rather, was real property for tax purposes. Transco.
Corp. v. Prince William Co.. 210 Va. 550, 172 S.E.2d 757 (1970).
That

court

agreed

that

the

chief

test

to

be

considered

in

determining whether the chattel has been converted into a fixture
is the intention of the party making the annexation. We agree, but
conclude that in the instant case, the intention of Enron was not
to convert its annexations into fixtures.

Consequently, we find

the pipelines to be personal property.
Finally, because the unitary value of Enron may include some
real property, it is necessary that we determine whether that
portion of its valuation should be based on an aggregate or blended
ratio, or on the average ratio of unimproved agricultural land.
In Keamev Convention Center v. Boayd 9 f Equal. . 216 Neb. 292,
344 N.W.2d 620 (1984), we held that the uniformity clause of the
Nebraska Constitution required that the complaining taxpayer's land
had to be valued at 44 percent, the lowest ratio of assessed
valuation to actual valuation.

We had concluded that although the

taxing authorities may classify different types of property for
taxation

purposes, nevertheless, the results reached

by

such

different methods and reasonable classifications must be correlated
so that the valuations reached shall be uniform and proportionate.
The record in this case does not support such a favorable finding
for the Board.
Although article VIII, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution was
amended

in

1984

in

an

attempt

to

permit

the

valuation

of

agricultural land by a different method, this court concluded that
the result must be correlated with the value of all other land.
At the risk of being redundant, we state that such a result has not
been reached in this case*
The Board has asked us to reconsider our decision in Banner
County v. State Board of Equal., 226 Neb. 236, 411 N.W.2d 35
-19-

(1987) .

There is n^v, •
nothing to reconsider. Neb. const
art
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REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
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